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UNIFORMITY AND DIVERSITY IN A DIVIDEDPOWER SYSTEM: THE UNITED STATES'
EXPERIENCE
Eric Stein*
Ted Stein and I became friends during his term as visiting professor in
Ann Arbor. He was immersed in the United States-Iranian arbitration and I
worked on problems of integration of states in divided-power systems. We
had longlalks. The general idea of this essay goes back to that time. The last
time I saw Ted was at a conference in Florence. I still see him deeply
moved, contemplating the church of Santa Croce and the sea of Florentine
roofs bathed in the scintillating light of the Tuscan morning. It is with a
sense of grave personal loss that I submit my contribution to this commemorative issue.
I.

THE PROBLEM

Tension between harmony and disharmony, uniformity and diversity,
central power and local power, legislature and judiciary, executive and
legislature-is endemic to a divided-power system such as the United
States federation. Even while constructing a more centralized order to
replace a disintegrating confederation, the drafters of the American Constitution worried about preserving regional diversity. I In the new federation,
private law was to remain in principle within the preserve of the states,
subject to specified powers delegated to the federal authorities and general
constitutional restrictions. The states were to retain the complete hierarchy
of state courts, with the full federal judiciary added. Although common law
has provided a vital underpinning for essential uniformity, the process of
administering common law has allowed for substantial diversity. The
concern for diversity has remained a part of the public discourse in America
even though the forces of the industrial, post-industrial, and "post-material" revolutions have worked mightily against diversity and for uniformity
and a uniform rule.
*Hessel E. Yntema Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Michigan Law School. I wish to
acknowledge the generous advice I have received from my colleagues of the University of Michigan
Law Faculty, particularly the detailed comments by Professors Chambers, Conard, Pierce and Dean
Sandalow, and by Professors Friedman of ihe Stanford Law School and Juenger of the University of
California at Davis Law School. Dr. Mathias Reimann assisted me ably in the research. I completed this
article during my stay as a fellow at the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin-Institute for Advanced Study
Berlin. An earlier version served as a basis for a paper delivered at the Max Planck Institute for Foreign
and International Private Law in Hamburg, Federal Republic of Germany, and was translated into
German for publication in the Rabels Zeitschrift fur auslindisches und internationales Privatrecht.
I. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 22-23 (J. Madison) (R. Fairfield ed. 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 56, at 365-70 (J. Madison or A. Hamilton) (1976).
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The modest purpose of this paper is to inquire, in a specific contemporary context, why, by whom, and through what process a uniform rule is
accepted or imposed in place of diverse rules. The first, methodological
part of the paper offers a pattern for an analysis; the second part applies the
pattern and illustrates the working of the process in the field of family law. I
have chosen family law because in that field there has traditionally been
concern for regional differences and because there has been an instructive
interplay between regional and central powers.
It may not come as a surprise that the inquiry will lead us to issues at the
heart of the federal process. Moreover, the institutional analysis will bring
us to the threshold of societal problems arising out of cultural heterogeneity
and caused by value conflicts of private against public good and equality
2
against individual achievement.
II.

TOWARD UNIFORMITY-A PROCESS

A.

The Three Faces of Uniformity

When I speak of uniformity I have generally in mind not only the
situation of identical norms but also a situation in which norms are diverse
but lead to essentially identical results. As is the case with many concepts,
"legal" uniformity has different meanings in different contexts.
There is, in the first place, the uniformity within each component state of
the Union, ultimately promoted by the state's supreme court-a concept
essentially similar to the uniformity in a unitary state. However, this aspect
of uniformity is complicated in the American federation by the existence of
two complete hierarchies of courts, federal and state. Until 1938, federal
courts were free to make their own determination about common law. A
party in a controversy with a citizen of another state who considered the
federal law more favorable to his side could bring it before a federal court,
which would apply federal common law, rather than before a state court,
which would apply potentially different and less favorable state common
law. Uniformity thus prevailed within the federal system at the price of
diversity within the same state, since federal and state courts within the
same state could apply different law to the same facts. 3 Since 1938,
however, by a decision of the United States Supreme Court, "[t]here [has
been] no federal general common law," 4 so that both the federal and state
courts in a state must apply the same substantive state law: the uniformity
2. Smelser & Halpern, The HistoricalTriangulationofFamily,Economy andEducation, 84 AM. J.
Soc. S288, S300-01 (Supp. 1978).
3. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1(1842).
4. Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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within the state is victorious at the price of uniformity in the application of
common law by the federal courts. Yet, subsequently a subtle development
has led to the reemergence of federal common law in a new reincarnation,
5
where federal interest in a uniform rule demands special recognition.
There is, in the second place, the uniformity within the system of federal
law based on federal statutes (Acts of Congress) and rulings of the federal
executive and of federal agencies implementing federal statutes. The problem here, for instance, is to ensure that in the application of the federal
income tax law, a citizen of Michigan is taxed not more nor less than a
citizen of California.
Last but not least, there is uniformity, or-perhaps more accurately-the
lack of uniformity between the states (and sometimes even within the
states). The bulk of all law in the United States is still the law of the fifty
states, which varies often quite egregiously from state to state. The vast
majority of judicial cases are decided by state courts under these divergent
state laws, and, in the absence of a federal question, there is no judicial
super-authority-such as one encounters in unitary states-which would
wield the power to review decisions of state supreme courts for uniformity.
Although not compelled to do so by the rule of precedent, state courts do
look at sister states' court decisions, except in matters of particularly local
concern.
The diversity of results in various state courts is aggravated by each
state's liberty to apply its own rules even to events that occur in other states.
Neither the Supreme Court, nor for that matter Congress, has been prepared to bring order into the confused field of interstate conflict of laws,
6
which by definition would seem to call for uniform rules.
To illustrate the complexity of the system, Professor Conard suggests
that if, for instance, an American attorney is to give reliable advice to a
national corporation doing business throughout the American "common
market," he should have in his library the fifty sets of state corporate laws,
the forty-nine sets of state securities laws, the fifty sets of state courts
decisions, not to speak of the extensive federal materials governing corpo7
rate securities.

5. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-andof the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383
(1964). See generally E. SCOLS & P. HAY, CoNiCr OF LAws 133-48 (1982).
6. E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 5, passim; Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critique of Interest
Analysis, 32 AM. J. CoMP. L. 1 (1984); Kay, Theory into Practice:Choice of Law in the Courts, 34
MERCER L. REv. 521 (1983).
7. A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS INPERSPECTIVE 49 (1976). The State of Delaware has no securities
act. Id. at 19.
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On first sight-and perhaps on the second as well-the picture is one of
unmitigated chaos. Are there any ordering forces and instrumentalities that
work to reduce the "chaos" in the interest of uniformity?
B.

Uniformity Through Voluntary Process

In what I would call a "voluntary" process, a "lead" state, responding to
pressures for a change, may initiate a trend in state legislatures toward
similar if not identical solutions. 8 Again, states may enter into interstate
agreements or "compacts," with (but often without) the consent of Congress. Such agreements have harmonizing effects on the laws of the
participating states. 9
The movement toward uniformity is abetted by the public or private
institutions offering uniform or model acts for consideration by state
legislatures. Foremost among the public institutions is the venerable Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws established in 1892 by
the legislatures of all the states of the Union. Its triumph (shared with the
American Law Institute) has been the acceptance by every state of the
Uniform Commercial Code, thus bringing about a substantial uniformity in
commercial law in the United States; but the majority of the currently
recommended acts in other fields have been adopted by less than ten states,
and quite a few by none. 10
The uniform laws are often substantially modified in the process of
adoption and, after adoption, divergent interpretations by state courts may
further dilute the uniformity. However, the influence of the Commissioners' work cannot be measured solely in terms of formal adoptions.
Their activities have been particularly helpful to smaller states that lack
expert staff and adequate facilities to engage in studies and to draft
legislation. 11
8. G. STEINER, THE FUTILITY OF FAMILY POLICY 56 (1981) (Colorado on legalizing abortion). On the
process generally, see Friedman & Teubner in I INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW-EuROPE AND THE
AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE (M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe, J. Weiler eds., forthcoming).
9.
10.

L. DI MARZO, COMPONENT UNITS OF FEDERAL STATES AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS (1980).
1983 HANDBOOK NAT'L CONE COMMR'S ON UNIF. ST. LAWS & PROC. ANN. CON.

MEETING

470-75 [hereinafter (year) HANDBOOK UNIF. ST. LAWS].
1I. The beneficial effects of the "voluntary process" at its best are illustrated by the unification, for
all practical purposes, of the law of commercial transactions in goods (as distinguished from services),
resulting from the universal adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code. There have been systemic
benefits incidental to the primary business purpose: in interpreting the Uniform Code, state courts are
more inclined to consider decisions of other states, and they frequently give greater weight to the
original text of the Code than to deviations in their own state enactment: courses on commercial law in
law schools, which form the attitudes of the bar, emphasize uniformity of interpretation; the attraction
ofthe Code is illustrated by the fact that although federal common law governs contracts with the United
States, the Supreme Court has "incorporated" the relevant Code provisions into federal law (see United
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Various private organizations have furthered the trend towards uniformity. The voluntary national association of lawyers, the American Bar
Association (ABA), often operates in conjunction with the Conference of
Commissioners. While the ABA generally supports the work of the Conference, it also supplements the uniform laws with its own model acts and
"minimum standards," with varying success in the legislative halls. In
addition, the model codes and "restatements" of the law prepared by the
American Law Institute, another voluntary institution, have exerted considerable impact, particularly on the judiciary, in a number of fields. A
myriad of professional organizations (for example, accountants, brokers,
state government officials), insurance companies, and testing laboratories
have been an important force in overcoming-outside the prescriptive
process-some of the glaring inconveniences of diversity.
Finally, the codes of federal rules of civil and criminal procedure and
evidence, promulgated by the United States Supreme Court under a congressional mandate for use in federal courts, have also served as models for
state legislation. About one half of the states have adopted part or all of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, so that lawyers in many states work, in
effect, with a largely equivalent set of procedural rules. At times, states
have built their own regulatory system in the image of national legislation
such as the National Labor Relations Act. A somewhat analogous radiation
effect upon state administrative rules and procedures can be traced to the
lively intercourse between state and federal officials, particularly as a result
of state administration of federal programs, the new patterns of federalstate co-decisionmaking, and the mobility between state and federal bu12
reaucracies.
C.

Uniformity Through FederalPower (Compulsory Process)

1.

The NationalRule

Not surprisingly, federal power has provided the most powerful impetus
toward uniformity, resulting in a uniform national rule, uniformity's most
radical manifestation. A national rule may take any one of several forms: an
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979)); last but not least, Congress, which enacted the
Code for the Virgin Islands, the District of Columbia, and Guam, has found it unnecessary to enter the
commercial arena with broad legislation as contrasted with its role in consumer protection. Divergent
state courts' interpretations appear to be limited to a few areas where litigation abounds; when
substantial consensus emerges the Commissioners draft appropriate amendments to the Code for
adoption by the Code states. Many of the above ideas were suggested to me by my colleague Professor
J.J. White.
12. The interaction between federal and state authorities has contributed to the improvement of
state governments.
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act of Congress; an executive order or a federal agency rule, both of which
result from a delegation by Congress; or-last but not least-of ajudgment
of the United States Supreme Court interpreting federal statutory law or the
Constitution. 13
Federal power is circumscribed by the text of the Constitution, by
tradition, and above all by important political restraints. Nevertheless,
since the late 1930's, owing to the broad construction of federal power by
the "New Deal" Supreme Court, the Congress has been able, for all
practical purposes, to exercise plenary legislative power in the economic
field at any rate, not unlike the legislature in a unitary state. This has meant
a dramatic proliferation of uniform national rules. In areas where Congress
may feel barred by the Constitution or by politics from legislating uniform
rules, it has employed extensively the device of making federal funds
available to states on condition that they accept a more or less stringently
defined policy.
Keep in mind that federal law "rests upon a substructure of state law," 14
in that "[i]t builds upon legal relationships established by the states,
altering or supplanting them only so far as necessary for [its] special
purpose."' 15 Even where federal power is exclusive, as for instance in
federal tax laws, in the social security system, or in foreign relations, state
law and state authority often impinge on its operations. Federal statutes
often contain words and embody concepts, the meaning of which is defined
by state law. Where divergence among state law definitions impairs the
uniform application of the federal rule, as in federal income tax law,
Congress steps in and provides its own uniform definition. 16 Where state
and federal jurisdictions are concurrent, as in economic regulation (for
example, in environmental law or labor law), the two systems interact
intimately. Finally, even where state power is "exclusive," federal power
has increasingly intruded, as will be demonstrated in the example of family
17
law.
2.

The Role of FederalJudiciary

a.

Uniformity and Conflicts Between the Courts

As I have suggested earlier, state courts decide the overwhelming majority of cases, and it is the responsibility of the respective state supreme
13.
14.

For a discussion of the Supreme Court's role, see infra notes 18-34 and accompanying text.
Sandalow, Federalismand Social Change, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 29 (1980).

15.

P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL

COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 471 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter P. BATOR].
16. E.g., I.R.C. § 2518 (CCH 1985) (disclaimers).
17. See infra notes 52-75 and accompanying text.
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courts to maintain uniformity within each state by resolving conflicts
between decisions of the lower courts of the same state. State courts have to
share judicial power with federal courts in only an "infinitesimally small"
fraction of cases that raise federal questions. 18
In the federal system, ninety-four federal district courts are supervised
by thirteen circuit courts of appeal with the United States Supreme Court at
the apex of the pyramid. The problem of maintaining uniformity has been
greatly magnified by the enormous growth in the appellate dockets. The
rapid increase in the number of judges required to cope with the overload
has made it more difficult within each appellate court to avoid internal
conflicts between the panels. 19 More importantly, since no federal court of
appeal is bound to respect the decisions of another, conflicts among these
courts occur. Although the Supreme Court takes into consideration the
existence of such conflicts in accepting cases for review 20 it does not review
a sufficient number of cases to resolve all such conflicts "or indeed even a
small fraction of [them]. "21 As a result, the "non-constitutional" areas of
federal law, such as the important cases that come out of federal administrative agencies, are generally left by the Supreme Court to the courts of
appeal. 22 These courts talk about the need of uniformity and they stress a
policy of avoiding conflicts, 23 but one experienced critic has charged them
with a lack of "institutional responsibility" about avoiding conflicts because they know that their decisions will not be reviewed. 24 This leads to
18. R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME CouRT PRACTICE 262 (5th ed. 1978) (quoting from
Brennan, State CourtDecisionsand the Supreme Court, 31 PENN. BARAss'NQ. 393,395-96 (1960)).
19. Marcus, ConflictsAmong Circuitsand Transfers Within the FederalJudicialSystem, 93 YALE
L.J. 677, 689 (1984).
20. At present there are only a few classes of cases that can be appealed to the Supreme Court as
matter of right, rather than by application for the discretionary "writ of certiorari." See R. STERN & E.
GREsSMAN, supra note 18, at 317 & passim; id. at 262-73; Sup. Cr. R.P. 19(b) (listing inter-circuit
conflicts as one of the possible reasons for granting a review); see also Bailey v. Weinberger, 419 U.S.
953 (1974) (White, Douglas, and Stewart, JJ., dissenting); Harlan, Manning the Dikes, 13 REc. A.B.
CrrY N.Y. 541,550 (1958); generallyP. BATOR, supra note 15, at 631. Some doubts have been raised as
to how much weight the Court gives in practice to the existence of conflicts among lower courts. A 1963
analysis of 3500 Supreme Court cases from the 1947 through 1958 terms named three "cues" as
exerting major influence in the selection of cases for review: first, the favoring of the grant by the federal
government; second, a conflict among lower courts; and third, the presence of a civil liberty issue.
Tanenhaus, Schick, Muraskin & Rosen, The Supreme Court'sCertiorariJurisdiction:Cue Theory, in
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING I11(G. Schubert ed. 1963). However, a 1972 study based only on cases
from the 1958 term, rejected the second and third cues and found that only the fact that the federal
government favored the review could be shown to have significant impact. Ulmer, Hintze & Kirklosky,
The Decision to Grant orDeny Certiorari:FurtherConsiderationof Cue Theory, 6 L. & Soc'Y REv.
637 (1972).
21. Note, Securing Uniformity in National Law: A Proposalfor National Stare Decisis in the
Courtsof Appeals, 87 YALE L.J. 1219, 1223 (1978).
22. Id.
23. Marcus, supra note 19, at 687.
24. Griswold, Rationing Justice-The Supreme Court's Caseloadand What the Court Does Not
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"forum shopping" among federal courts and uneven enforcement of federal
law in different parts of the country.
There is currently a wide-ranging national debate on whether or not the
Supreme Court has the time and will to resolve the divergence in interpretation. There are controversial proposals to establish a new National Court of
Appeals with the jurisdiction to resolve inter-circuit conflicts. 25 Opponents
of these proposals contend that the persistence of the divergent interpretations over a period of time will enable the Supreme Court to deal with
issues "more wisely at a later date," 26 and that elimination27 of regional
influence in divergent interpretations would be undesirable.
Whatever may be the merits of the National Court of Appeals proposal, it
is not likely to be accepted by the Congress in the foreseeable future. In the
meantime, much depends on the willingness of the courts of appeals to pay
attention to the courts in other circuits. As Judge Lay expressed it:
Although we are not bound by another circuit's decision, we adhere to the
policy that a sister circuit's reasoned decision deserves great weight and
precedential value. As an appellate court, we strive to maintain uniformity in
the law among circuits, wherever reasoned analysis will allow, thus avoiding
unnecessary burdens on the Supreme Court docket. Unless our 11 courts of
appeals are thus willing to promote a cohesive network of national law,
needless division and confusion will encourage further splintering and the
formation of otherwise28unnecessary additional tiers in the framework of our
national court system.

b.

Preserving Uniformity of National Rules

The United States Supreme Court performs another influential function
by protecting the integrity of the uniform rules in the Constitution against
the other federal branches of government, and, more importantly, by
Do, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 341-42 (1975).

25. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and White favored the idea. See Brown Transport
Corp. v. Atcon, 439 U.S. 1014 (1978). The recently established United States Courts of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (replacing the United States Court of Customs and Appeals) was given exclusive
jurisdiction to receive appeals in patent infringement matters and this eliminated inter-circuit conflicts
in that field. 28 U.S.C. § 1294 (1982). A similar solution in the federal tax field was blocked by the
opposition of the tax bar.
26. See Justice Stevens' opinion on denial of certiorari in McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961.962
(1983). However, McCray did not concern a conflict of decisions within the federal system. In Justice
Stevens' judgment, "it is a sound exercise of discretion for the Court to allow the various States to serve
as laboratories in which the issue receives further study before it is addressed by this Court." Id. at 963.
27. Marcus, supra note 19, at 690 (citing the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court
Appellate System, Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195,
235 (1975) (Hruska Commission)).
28. Aldens, Inc. v. Miller, 610 F.2d 538, 541 (1979). As stated above, there are now 13 courts of
appeals.
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defending the Constitution and federal law against state intrusions. Although the Court often exalts national uniformity, this goal appears to be
more an inspiration to silver-tongued rhetoric than a decisive variable. For
instance, in wielding the power of constitutional review under the clause
that gives Congress the authority to regulate interstate commerce, the
Court is concerned more with economic unity of the nation, rather than
with normative uniformity. At this stage of its history, at any rate, the Court
is tolerant of diverse state legislation unless the legislation is motivated by a
more or less explicit protectionist purpose to discriminate against goods or
services from other states. Where, however, national transportation systems are hampered by state regulation of train lengths, truck sizes,
mudguard requirements, etc., the Court imposes strictest uniformity and
29
strikes down deviant state laws.
The Court also imposes rigorous restrictions on state power when it
comes to applying a uniform rule for the protection of individual rights
derived from the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. This is the process of
"constitutionalization" of traditional areas of state law, as manifested, for
example, in criminal procedure and family law. The scope of this "constitutionalizing" process is unprecedented in other systems.
When faced with an allegation of a conflict between a federal statute and
state law, the Court manipulates the doctrine of "preemption"-a finelytuned instrument for determining whether Congress "intended" to preclude the exercise of state power on a given subject or in an entire field.
After attempting without success to construct a generally applicable preemption standard, the Court now openly resorts to balancing the respective
state and federal interests. In areas where in the Court's judgment uniform
national policy is needed-as for instance in labor relations, in the interest
of preserving industrial peace-the Court generally holds that the federal
30
statute "preempts" the state law.
In the process of deciding whether to lay down a constitutional rule or
whether a federal statute has preempted the field, the Court sometimes
considers trends in state legislation. 3' Occasionally, the Court even subordinates uniformity as a value to the utility of social or economic experimen32
tation, with one or more states serving as laboratories.
29. See articles by Stein & Sandalow, Linde, Blasi, Rosberg, and Conard in COURTS AND FREE
MARETS--PERSPECIVES FROM THE UNrrED STATES AND EUROPE 26-27, 140-221, 276-384 (T. Sandalow & E. Stein ed. 1982).
30. See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969).
But cf. Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders, 468 U.S. 491 (1984).
31. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (considering the law in "a majority of the
States").
32. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356,377 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). But see New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (a "pre-New Deal" decision
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After the Second World War and through the earlier years of the Burger

Court, the controlling emphasis was on preserving and expanding national
rules as against the diverse state rules. Recent developments in fields as

varied as criminal procedure and corporate securities may signal a slowing
down of this trend. 33 It would be interesting to observe whether such a trend
from uniformity toward greater diversity, if it indeed materializes, could be
correlated with the cyclical oscillation between liberalism and con34
servatism which Schlesinger discerns in American history.
Forcesfor Legal Uniformity: The Five Syndromes

D.

It would exceed the scope of this study to attempt an economic and social
analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of diversity and uniformity,
important as such an effort would be in providing an appropriately broad
describing the Court's holding to mean that a state business regulation cannot be saved from condemnation by calling it "experimental"); see also Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921)
(Holmes, J., dissenting). In Truax, Justice Holmes observed that:
There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond the
absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the making of social experiments that an important
part of the community desires, in the insulated chambers afforded by the several states, even
though the experiments may seem futile or even noxious to me and to those whose judgment I most
respect.
Id.
33. In criminal procedure, see, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). Responding to voices for a stricter enforcement of "law and order," the
Court has been grafting substantial exceptions on its earlier constitutional rulings that imposed strict
restraints upon law enforcement authorities. Constitutional Law Conference in 53 U.S.L.W. 2187,
2189-91 (Oct. 16, 1984) (comments of Professor Yale Kamisar); 54 U.S.L.W. 2196, 2202 (Oct. 15,
1985) (comments of Professor Lawrence Tribe). Professor Tribe observed that compared with the
United States Supreme Court's "sharp and visible turn to the right" in the 1983-84 term, the Court "this
past term" appeared to be moving back toward the "constitutional mainstream." Id. at 2202. Professor
Conard also sees a "sharp rightward turn taken [by the Supreme Court] during the 1970's in the Court's
approaches to [corporate] securities law." Conard, Tender Offer Fraud: The Secret Meaning of
Subsection 14(e), 40 Bus. LAw. 87, 96, 97-99, 101 (1984). In the area of corporate securities law, the
Court's tendency to restrict the reach of a uniform national rule (and even to disregard the interpretations by the competent administrative agency) reflects "the widespread suspicion that regulation has
reached the point of diminishing returns, where further expansion is unlikely to confer economic
benefits that exceed its costs." Id. at 98. The Court's tendency in this area also reflects the possible
negative effects of the volume of litigation, and the reluctance to interfere with commercial expectation
in a "traditional area of state law." Id. at 101. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977):
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); see also Hazen. Corporate Chartering
and the SecuritiesMarkets:ShareholderSuffrage, CorporateResponsibility and ManagerialAccountability. 1978 Wis. L. REv. 391, 415 & passim. At the same time, according to Professor Buxbaum,
federal courts currently do not hesitate to strike down state securities regulations as contrary to the
Federal Constitution or congressional legislation-thus upholding a uniform rule. He sees the "preemptive slaughter of state securities regulation law spreading to state corporation law." Buxbaum,
Federalism and Company Law in Festschrift in Honor of Eric Stein, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1163, 1165-66
(1984).
34. Schlesinger, Tides of American Politics, 29 YALE REv. 217-30 (1939).
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context for a normative inquiry. I trust, however, that some, if not most of
the relevant variables can be found, at least implicitly, in the text that
follows. It must suffice here to enumerate, in neutral terms and on the basis
of little more than intuition, the principal syndromes that unleash forces
which pull towards legal uniformity:
1. Thefreedom and equalitysyndrome: Social and economic change that
has created a demand for national guarantees of freedom and equality, and
35
for uniform policy in many areas of life.
2. The "dollars-and-cents" syndrome:
(a) Profit-maximization of private interest groups through improved
standards, increased efficiency, simplification and systematization, etc.
(b) Budgetary concerns of public institutions.
3. The bureaucraticcentralizationsyndrome: The expanding role of the
central government in the life of the nation.
4. The effective law enforcement syndrome: The need for effective
enforcement in inter-state situations, and the need for preventing subversion of local policies and "forum shopping," which creates a drive to
"patch up the holes" in the federal system.
5. The Cartesiansyndrome: Theoretical concern for comprehensiveness
and structural harmony.
The forces for social and economic change of the first syndrome may
initially cause the prevailing uniformity to be undermined, only to be
replaced, after a period of fragmentation and diversity, by a new uniformity. In contrast with continental Europe, the Cartesian syndrome is the
weakest of the five in the United States, where common law mentality and
innate pragmatism place little value on systematization as such. It may be
present, however, along with the other syndromes, in the minds of the
reporters on uniform state laws, drawn predominately from among law
professors.
The five syndromes do not operate in isolation but interact actively in
most instances when a uniform rule emerges. For example, the first four
syndromes are discernible in the growth of uniform national rules intruding
into the state-law-governed relationship between corporate management,
shareholders, and investors: the 1930's scandal of massive fraud causing
widespread financial disasters and nationwide indignation; the failure of
the states to act, with the consequent radical intervention by Congress; and
the persistent reach for more power by the supervising bureaucracy imposed by the Congress.
35. Professor Allen speaks of the "pervasive unease [after World War II] about threats to individual
liberty" and of the "danger of systems of criminal justice being employed as instrumentalities of
tyranny." Allen, American CriminalProcedure:Why the Dominance ofJudge-Made Law?, in POLICE
PRACrICEs AND THE LAW, ESSAYS FROM THE MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 1, 2 (F. Allen ed. 1982).
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The revolution in transport and communication (first syndrome) and the
consequent dramatic growth of nationwide commerce demanding uniformity (second syndrome) are reflected in the important "voluntary" uniformization of commercial law. However, a threat of federal imposition had
loomed in the background and it may have contributed to the success of the
voluntary process. 36 The interplay of the fourth, "gap filling" syndrome
with the first two, is illustrated by the two acts of Congress described in the
next section, which were designed to deal with "child-snatching" and with
absent fathers owing family support in inter-state situations beyond the
37
reach of enforcement by individual states.
The syndromes also operate transnationally-with greater or lesser
intensity-on the global and regional levels and lead to uniform rules or
principles in treaties and resolutions or declarations by international groups
and organizations. Their influence upon the United States, while increasing
in the last decades, is substantially less pervasive than it is upon smaller
countries with less power and more dependent economies. Thus, for
instance, the United States has not accepted the bulk of the widely ratified
conventions of the International Labor Organization that have been motivated by both social concerns over working conditions (first syndrome) and
considerations of international economic competition (second syndrome).
Nor has the United States adhered to the principal United Nations covenants purporting to provide uniform world rules on fundamental human
rights (first syndrome). Needless to say, the process toward uniformity at
the international level, although propelled largely by identical syndromes,
is much more onerous than in the domestic arena.
III.

THE WORKING OF THE PROCESS: TOWARD UNIFORMITY
IN FAMILY LAW?

Ever since Montesquieu, and surely since Max Weber, there has been
little doubt about the interaction between law and society. If there is any
field in which one would expect a particularly intimate link between legal
norms and local culture, it is family law. In the United States, that law has
been left within the preserve of the states. As late as 1956 the Supreme
Court declaimed: "[T]here is no federal law of domestic relations, which is
"38 State legislation has varied
primarily a matter of state concern ..
greatly, though reflecting, on the whole, traditional family values.
36.

Dunham, A Histor\y of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 30

LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 241 (1965).
37. See infra notes 52, 53, 57 and accompanying text.
38. De Sylva v. Ballantine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956).
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A dramatic change in the society over the last thirty years has brought
about a radical turn from diversity to a degree of uniformity. World War II,
new technology, massive movements to cities, changes in the composition
of the urban population, increased mobility-all of these factors contributed to the breakdown in the consensus over the traditional concepts of
marriage, family, and sexual morality. There has been a new emphasis on a
pluralistic society and varied styles of life. Personal relations are seen less
in moralistic traditional terms, and more in terms of personal growth and
satisfaction; and psychiatric expertise has been given a major role. Minority and women's groups have entered the political process and there has
been a change in the perception of the role of the government. " [I]t seems
no exaggeration," wrote Dean Sandalow, "to say that the United States
has, during the past decade, experienced a revolution, a momentous
alteration in the aggregation of attitudes and practices that defined a
39
traditional societal stance toward the family.",
A.

Uniformity by State Action: Marriagesand Divorce

In 1963, 66.31% of all terminated marriages ended by death and 33.69%
by divorce. By 1979 only 42.79% terminated by death, while 57.23%
ended by divorce. In 1930 there were six marriages to every divorce; in 1981
40
the ratio was two to one.
Most Americans in the twentieth century no longer believed that divorce
should be available only when one of the parties had committed some
marital sin, such as adultery or "cruel treatment," yet nearly all state laws
still required proof of fault. Unhappy couples regularly engaged in collusion to obtain divorces both partners wanted; and the courts winked at the
practices. The underpinnings of the traditional concept of divorce for fault
had been eroded. The time for reform was ripe and the reform objective
clear. Desire for simplification and greater coherence provided additional
impulses for change in the law. At the end of the 1960's California started
41
the trend toward no-fault divorce.
In 1965 the Ford Foundation and the federal government provided funds
for a study, sponsored by the State Commissioners on Uniform Laws with
the advice of the American Bar Association. In 1970, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 42 incorporating no-fault divorce and a greatly
39. Sandalow, supranote 14, at 29-30. For a critical view, see Riga, The Supreme Court, Marriage
and the Family: Tradition or Transition?, 1979 JURIST 325 (1979).
40. UNIF. MARITAL PROPERTY Acr, in 1983 HANDBOOK UNIF. ST. LAWS, supra note 10, at 135
(prefatory note).
41. Id.
42. 1970 HANDBOOK UNI. ST. LAWS, supra note 10, at 180-222.
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reduced list of prohibited marriages, saw the light of day, and by 1983 it
had been adopted in full or as amended in seven states. By 1984, however,
all the other states had already removed the fault features except for South
Dakota which continued to adhere to fault-based divorce. 43 The introduction of no-fault also advanced uniformity in the granting of divorces by
eliminating judicial discretion inherent in the determination of fault of one
side against the other. Thus substantial uniformity on a vital issue was
achieved in two decades without federal intervention. Uniformity or similarity in substantive divorce law has reduced the problem of "migratory"
or "tourist" divorces, which had subverted state autonomy in local affairs-the object of federalism-and which had caused unacceptable dis44
crimination and legal uncertainty.
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act extended the no-fault notion to
the treatment of property upon dissolution of the marriage and most states
incorporated in their legislation modifying the divorce law, a provision for
"equitable distribution" between the divorced spouses. This approach was
further articulated in the innovative 1983 Uniform Marital Property Act
("Property Act"), which takes into account the rapidly growing number of
two-worker households, and responds to the new militancy of women's
groups. 45 Under the Property Act, married couples own jointly all property
acquired by the effort of either or both of them during the course of the
marriage. This regime parallels the marital sharing under the community
property systems that have been historically the law in eight states. The
Property Act, which is also supposed to stem the migration of well-to-do
couples to the southwestern community property states, has already been
adopted (with some changes) in Wisconsin and is under consideration in

43. 1970 UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, in HANDBOOK UNIF. ST. LAWS, supra note 10, at
176-79 (Commissioner's prefatory note); see also Letter from Professor William J. Pierce, Executive
Director of the National Conference on Uniform State Laws, to Professor Eric Stein (Dec. 7, 1984) (on
file with Washington Law Review) [hereinafter the Pierce letter]. Interestingly, when the National
Conference of Commissioners was formed in 1892, marriage and divorce were named as one of the two
major subjects appropriate for uniform laws. Yet it was not until 1970 that agreement was reached on a
measure combining marriage and divorce. In the intervening years some dozen statutes were approved
dealing with the various aspects ofone or the other; but none of them received substantial acceptance by
the states. Id. at 176.
44. See UNIF. DIVORCE RECOGNITION AT, in 1947 HANDBOOK UNIF. ST. LAWS, at 174-76 (Commissioner's prefatory note). For the text, see 9 U.L.A. 644 (master ed. 1947). It can be argued, on the
other hand, that the migratory divorce used to provide an escape valve from state rules that hampered

divorce unreasonably.
45.
1983 HANDBOOK UNIF. ST. LAWS, supra note 10, at 135. The drafters report that the Act was "'a
response to the twenty-year-long challenge of the President's Commission on the Status of Women
issued in 1963 .. ." Id. at 9. Also relevant are provisions in the Uniform Probate Code of 1969
adopted in 15 states. Id. at 6.
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several other states. 46 A recent empirical study suggests, however, thatcontrary to universal expectations-the "equitable distribution" rule in a
no-fault divorce leaves the woman in a worse position than under the old
law. 47 Under the old law "the levers of fault and consent gave them some
power to bargain for a better financial settlement. . . .It is now obvious
that equality cannot be achieved by legislative fiat in a society in which men
48
and women are differently situated."
B.

Uniformity by State and FederalAction: Enter the Congress

Two problems have risen to the level of national concern: custody of
children, and support of mother and children. Both problems have been
aggravated by the mercurial mobility of the population, by the ease of
disappearing and assuming a new identity elsewhere, and by the discontinuity of federalism. In both cases the perceived crisis elicited responses at
both the state and federal levels.
1.

"Child Snatching" Across State Lines

Thousands of children are shifted from state to state every year while
their parents battle over their custody in the courts of several states. Child
snatching is rampant, and it was abetted by the absence of statutory law,
competing jurisdiction of the state courts, and the cavalier treatment of
custody awards received in sister states. 49 Each state saw itself free to
provide for the custody of a child physically within its borders and did not
consider itself bound by the custody decrees of another state. Children have
been the innocent victims of the "family law chaos."
46. The drafters point out that:
[fjorty-one traditional common law jurisdictions now use some form of property division as a
principal means of resolving economic dilemmas on dissolution of marriage. Adding the eight
community property jurisdictions in which such a division is an inherent aspect of spousal
property rights yields a total of 49. The one state missing. . . is Mississippi.
Id. at 5. See generally Cheadle, The Development of Sharing Principles in Common Law Marital
PropertyStates, 28 UCLA L. REv.1269 (1981); Younger, MaritalRegimes:AStory ofCompromise and
Demoralization,Together with Criticism andSuggestionsfor Reform, 67 CORNELL L. Rav. 45 (1981).
47. L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVoRcE REvOLUTION-THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 362, 365 (1985).
48. Id.
49. R. LEFAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAw 93-94 (3d ed. 1977). In this section I rely substantially
on Foster, ChildCustodyJurisdiction:UCCJA andPKPA, 27 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv.297 (198 1). See the
extensive sources cited therein, particularly Bodenheimer, InterstateCustody: InitialJurisdictionand
ContinuingJurisdictionunderthe UCCJA, 14 FAm. L.Q. 203 (1981). The author was reporter for the
Act and also played an important role in drafting the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction Act. See Bodenheimer, The Hague Draft Convention on International
Child Abduction, 14 FAM. L.Q. 99 (1980).
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The public debate over the legal remedy resulted in the 1968 Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, which proved to be the first true success of
the State Commissioners on Uniform Laws in the family law field. After a
slow start, this Act has become the law in all states. 50 The Act's jurisdictional provisions, although favoring strongly the child's "home state," '51
maintain some flexibility-at a certain price of stability and certainty-in
order to ensure the best interests of children. A noteworthy feature is the
law's reliance on the direct cooperation between the courts of the different
states.
Despite the progress of state legislation and practice, the pressure of
aroused public opinion led Congress to step in with the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980.52 This statute provides a nationwide rule that
seeks to eliminate the jurisdictional uncertainty left under the Uniform Act
by awarding exclusive jurisdiction to the "home state," and it compels each
state to recognize as binding custody decrees previously entered by the
court of another state. There is now some possibility of a conflict between
the greater flexibility of the widely adopted Uniform Act and the federal
statute; however, the latter must prevail by virtue of the supremacy clause of
53
the Federal Constitution.
2.

The Child Non-Support Scandal

In 1981, twenty-eight percent of the mothers who were owed child
support payments from absent fathers received nothing, while half did not
get the full amounts ordered by the court. Some two million children were
entitled under court orders to support that they were not receiving. In 1983,
federal and state governments spent more than $690 million to collect over
54
$2 billion worth of child support.
50. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 116 (master ed. 1979); Table of Jurisdictions Listing Uniform Acts Adopted, U.L.A. DIRECTORY OF UNIFORM ACTS AND CODES 8 (master ed.

pamphlet 1986). See also the Pierce Letter, supra note 43.
51. "Home state" means the state in which the child immediately before the time involved lived
with both or one of the parents for at least six months. A similar definition was adopted in the federal
legislation referred to in the text immediately below. See Foster, supra note 49. at 301 (giving the
legislative texts).
52. Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3566 (1980), (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A).
53. The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act "needlessly disturbs [the Uniform Act's] cooperative
system by mandating exclusive continuing jurisdiction of the original home state, unless a technical
home state chooses to defer to a state having closer connection with the pertinent facts and the child's
welfare." Foster, supra note 49, at 342. However, Professor William J. Pierce, Executive Directorof the
National Conference of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, rates the possibility of a conflict
between the federal and state legislation as minimal. The Pierce letter, supra note 43.
54. HouseAdopts Bill to Enforce Child Support, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9,1984, atA12,col. I;Reagan
Signs Bill Forcing Paymentsfor Child Support, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1984, at 1, col. I; S. REP. No.
387, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2397, 2408, 2416
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Clearly, love was not enough to motivate absent parents to pay child
support; and the states faced special problems when the parents moved
from state to state. The states were able to arrest men within their own
territory who persistently refused to pay, but had no power to arrest a
person in another state. Similarly, states had begun passing laws that
permitted courts to direct local employers to deduct child support from a
nonpayer's wages, but when the parent had moved to another state, the
original state had no power to order an out-of-state employer to make
deductions.
The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have been concerned with
this problem since early in this century. The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, adopted after several revisions in 1968, leaves it to the
state legislatures to define family support duties and is concerned solely
with enforcement of these duties where the "obligor" is in a state different
from the "obligee." All states have accepted the Act with various amendments,5 5 another resounding success of the "voluntary process." In reality,
however, the state measures "only slightly improved the chances for
56
collection."
Because of the explosive rise in welfare cost for aid to dependent
children, Congress has been concerned with the problems of support
enforcement since 1967. Finally, in the 1984 election year, when women
voters loomed particularly important, the President, although dedicated to
the "new federalism," signed, with enthusiasm, the "radical" Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, after they were adopted unanimously by both houses of Congress. 57 According to this Act, states are
required at the risk of losing vital federal funds, to enact far-reaching
enforcement legislation, including mandatory withholding from the delinquent parent's wages if support payments are in arrears, holding the
employer liable for the arrears he failed to withhold, imposing liens for such
arrears, expediting judicial proceedings, facilitating establishing paternity,
etc. Only the State of Wisconsin is exempted in order to allow it to continue
experimenting with its own system. This unprecedented federal intervention, no longer confined to federally aided welfare cases, was motivated by
commitment to women and compassion for children as well as by a concern
about growing expenditures of public welfare funds.
[hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 387].
55. UNIp. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT (REVISED), in 1968 HANDBOOK UNIF. ST.
LAvS, supra note 10, at 225-37. The older Uniform Civil Liability Support Act shows five adoptions.
56. G. STEINER, supra note 8, at 115.
57. The Child Support Enforcement Amendments, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (1984). The
legislation was designed to strengthen radically the program instituted by the 1967 amendments to the
Social Security Act. The Senate Committee on Finance concluded as far back as in 1972 that the
program needed to be strengthened. S. REP. No. 387, supra note 54, at 2402.
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A FederalConstitutionfor the Family? The Supreme Court Speaks

By the mid-1960's, "[the] Supreme Court Justices could no longer
suppress conscious awareness of familial or social conflict with the easy
aplomb of their predecessors." 58 Social changes brought the allocations of
competence between the state and federal power (and between the legislature and the judiciary) into conflict, leaving "the Court with a substantial
degree of freedom to decide whether they should be resolved by the
adoption of a constitutional-and, therefore, [uniform] national-rule or
59
whether they should be left for resolution by the states."
In today's climate, it is difficult for example to conceive that in 1966,
sixteen states still maintained on their books statutes outlawing and punishing interracial marriage. 60 When a couple, sentenced in Virginia under
such a statute to one year's imprisonment, appealed to the Supreme Court,
the unanimous Court reversed, striking down the statute on the ground that
it violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth
amendment to the federal Constitution. Clearly, the Court could not allow
for this type of "diversity;" here was an example of the imposition of a
uniform national standard of civil liberties.
An even more striking example is provided by a case that originated in
the State of Connecticut. A physician was convicted in the state court for
prescribing a contraceptive device to married persons. Under a statute
imposed by a Catholic majority in the Connecticut legislature this was
illegal. The United States Supreme Court invalidated the statute as violating the right of marital privacy which-although not mentioned in the
Constitution-is within the "penumbras, formed by emanations" from the
"specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights . . . that help give them life and
substance. "61
The greatly expanded right of privacy subsequently became an important component of the "new constitutional doctrine to adjudicate relations
both within the family and between the family unit and outsiders." 62 In
reviewing state (as well as federal) legislation, the Court has manipulated
its formulas of standards for judicial review to balance, on a case by case
basis, the interests of the state, of legitimate and illegitimate children,
parents and teachers, husbands and wives, women and men. And, the
Court has invoked the Due Process (both procedural and substantive) and
58.

59.
60.
61.
Justices
62.
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Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 329, 347.

Sandalow, supra note 14, at 31.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,484(1965) (opinion forthe Court by Douglas, J.). Two
dissented.
Burt, supra note 58, at 329. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
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Equal Protection Clauses to invalidate legislation that did not conform to its
vision of contemporary society. It is, as Dean Sandalow points out, a
striking testimony of the Court's inattention to the issues of federalism, that
no reasons are given in the opinions why, in an area traditionally within the
policy power of the states, they should now be foreclosed by a national
rule.

63

In 1971, the Court, for the first time in its history, held a classification on
the basis of sex unconstitutional. 64 In subsequent cases striking down both
federal and state statutes, the Court has established the "presumptive
invalidity of governmental discrimination on the basis of sex," ' 65 though
with some exceptions, to be sure. In the words of the Court, "[n]o longer is
the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and
66
only the male for the market place and the world of ideas. ,,
In the 1968-1977 decade, fourteen cases "have rather suddenly focused
legal concern upon a group which had previously received no attention" 67 -illegitimate children. The Court caused "a turn-about in the
status" of these children by invalidating during that period ten of the
68
fourteen statutes involved in these cases.
Of all the Supreme Court's excursions into family matters once regulated
solely by the states, "perhaps the most egregious instance with the most
far-reaching social consequences" 69 is the decision in Roe v. Wade, where
the Burger Court (with two dissents) laid down in detailed, statute-like

63. Sandalow, supra note 14, at 30, 33.
64. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (invalidating an Idaho statute imposing a preference of amale
over a female applicant for an appointment as an administrator of an estate).
65. Sandalow, supra note 14, at 32. For the cases in which the Court rejected or sustained the
gender classification, see id. at 32-38. The proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the Federal
Constitution, pressed with great vigor by women's groups, has failed to receive the required number of
ratifications by state legislatures.
66. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268,280 (1978) (citing Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 10, 14-15 (1975)).
In Orr,the Court struck down an Alabama statute imposing alimony obligation on husbands but not on
wives, on the ground that such a law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment.
67. Stenger, The Supreme Court and Illegitimacy: 1968-1977, 11 FAM. L.Q. 365, 400 (1978).
68. Id. The majority of the Court was not prepared to hold that a classification based on
illegitimacy or gender was "inherently suspect" (as in race or alienage) for the purpose of the equal
protection clause; such classification would call for the strictest standard ofjudicial review. The Court
has thus kept its hands free for case-by-case adjudication. On gender discrimination, see, e.g., Michael

M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). See generallyH. KRAUSE,
(1971).

ILLEGmMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL

POLICY

To help the states to adjust their law to the new constitutional situation, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform Parentage Act of 1973. The Act was
adopted in seven states (including California). 1973 HANDBOOK UNIF. ST.LAWS, supranote 10, at 335.
69. Burt, supra note 58, at 388.
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fashion the parameters of legality of abortion, and in the process invali70
dated legislation in some forty-odd states.
Only a year before, the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association had approved, over some opposition, the Uniform Abortion
Act, which was adopted earlier by the Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. 7' This Act reflected a more liberal trend in state laws
and court decisions, but it was so drafted as to allow the states considerable
discretion to prohibit or regulate abortion as local attitudes might dictate.
Actually, some one-third of the states had, since the late 1950's, significantly liberalized their abortion laws, 72 and during 1970 four states practically abolished restrictions. 73 Individual freedom to decide for abortion
thus became an accident of residence.
Yet the Court, motivated perhaps by the concern for "back room"
abortions of the poor in the more restrictive states, decided to end the
nationwide debate by imposing a detailed uniform rule. Unlike the situation in the Connecticut contraceptive case, even a semblance of a national
consensus had not evolved at the time. However, there was some prospect
that the political process could work out a tolerable accommodation of
strongly held competing views. The Court's intervention did not terminate
the debate, but on the contrary it sharply exacerbated the emotionally
charged controversy. In addition to the usual criticisms of the Justicesthat they were "legislating" on issues of policy, and that they were operating on the basis of limited data-the Court was also blamed in this case for
failing to see the significance of the ongoing debate in other institutions. As
an "implicit accommodation" to the anti-abortionists, Congress proceeded
to limit severely the use of federal funds for abortions and the deeply
divided Court upheld the measure. 74 After Roe, the Court has nonetheless
consistently continued to uphold the basic principle that a woman has a
fundamental right to make the "highly personal choice" whether or not to
terminate pregnancy, and it has tightened still further the restrictions on the
states, thus reducing the states' opportunities for dealing with local discontent. By 1983, however, the Court's liberal-conservative alliance over the
abortion issue showed some signs of wear; three Justices rejected the basic
75
premises of Roe and were perhaps even willing to overrule it.
70. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The decision decreed a total decriminalization of abortion
during the first trimester of pregnancy and limited decriminalization thereafter. G. STEINER, supra note
8, at 52. See also Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569 (1979).
71. For the text, which was based largely on New York legislation, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113.
146 (1973).
72. Id. at 140.
73. Id. at 140 n.37.
74. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). See also G. STEINER, supra note 8, at 54.
75. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.. 462 U.S. 416 n.7 (1983).

1100

Divided-Power System
IV.

SOME SUMMARY THOUGHTS

If one projects the developments in family law against the grid of the
forces for uniformity outlined earlier, it becomes readily apparent that all
five syndromes are involved, albeit in varying degree. The first syndrome
(social and economic change) is a pervasive force and it is propelled by
influential women's groups and other special interests. The financial concerns (second syndrome) of private individuals (single parent families,
women and children left without support), private welfare agencies and
public authorities (state welfare departments and the federal treasury)
motivate, at least in part, most of the state and federal legislation. Both acts
of Congress mentioned above reflect also the third and fourth syndromes;
they illustrate the expansion of the central government and at the same time
they seek to mitigate specific glaring flaws of federalism. As for the fifth
syndrome, academics and some members of the bar who provide the
principal brain power in drafting uniform laws are at times concerned with
the need for systematization of a particularly fragmented field of law.
There is no national "family policy," but the trend is toward national,
more or less uniform solutions. Ideas move quickly across the country,
reform groups operate nationally, and national academic circles and national law schools exert considerable influence.
In the last two decades the Conference on Uniform State Laws has scored
some significant successes by having its uniform laws widely adopted in
state legislatures. The Conference has been encouraged by Congress. 76
However, when an issue emerges as a national problem and political forces
are effectively mobilized, the federal government does not hesitate to act.
The Congress has shied away from direct substantive legislation except to
fill the gaps arising in the federal system and where federal competence was
clear. However, under successive administrations, including the current
one, the Congress has been employing freely the "carrot" technique by
offering states federal funds in return for their acceptance of federal
policies on a variety of subjects that have impinged directly or indirectly on
77
family law and relations.

76. In addition to the Uniform Acts mentioned in the text, see also the currently recommended acts.
UNIFORM PARENTAGE AcT, 9A U.L.A. 579 (1973); UNIFORM ADOPTION Acr, 9 U.L.A. 11 (1971); CIVIL
LIABILITY FOR SuPoRT Acr, 9 U.L.A. 171 (1953).
77. Sandalow, The Expansionof FederalLegislativeAuthority, in T. SANDALOw & E. STEIN, supra
note 29, at 83-84. On the many federal activities with an impact on the family, see, e.g., welfare laws,
family planning legislation, housing authority laws, etc.; Federal Protection of Children Against Sexual
Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 8 (1978) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2251-2253 (1982); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTs, Federal Response to Domestic Violence (1982).
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Although the vast majority of court cases are decided in state courts
under still more or less divergent state laws, the process of "constitutionalization" has gone some considerable distance toward imposing uniformity. The process also offers an insight into the interaction between law
and society. Thus, when it came to removing criminality from interracial
marriages or discrimination against illegitimate children, statutory law
lagged behind a widely held, changed attitude in the society, but it proved
difficult to activate change through legislation because of strongly entrenched forces. The Supreme Court's ruling imposed uniformity more in
keeping with general attitudes despite striking local variations. In the useof-contraceptive situation, the Court's ruling helped to crystallize a clear
trend toward a new consensus. On the issue of abortion, however, the Court
imposed a uniform norm in the face of persistent, strongly-held differences;
political and legal difficulties persist.
In family law, as in some other fields of law, constitutional law as
declared by the United States Supreme Court serves as "the means by
which effect is given to ideas that from time to time are held to be
fundamental in defining the limits and distribution of governmental power
in our society." 7 8 A uniform rule imposed upon the states and reducing
their role in response to social change often has had as its consequence an
advancement of individual freedom.

78.
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Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1184 (1977).

